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The international role
of "domestic" bureaucracy
Raymond F. Hopkins

Many agencies of the United States Government with nominally "domestic" man·
dates play important roles in international affairs, and collaborate extensively with
other governments and international organizations in the performance of their tasks.
In some areas, these agencies rather than intergovernmental organizations play key
management roles. Data gathered from a variety of sources indicate the extensiveness
of this involvement, and suggest that it continues to expand, although not in linear
fashion. Certain trends in governmental reorganization, such as those in the Agriculture Department, suggest similar patterns to those observed in business firms as they
become more heavily involved abroad. More attention needs to be paid to international networks involving "domestic" governmental bureaucracies and governmental agencies traditionally oriented toward international affairs. From a
conceptual point of view, we should think of "international organization" as
including not only formally intergovernmental organizations, but all officials who
participate significantly in these networks.

The management of international activities requires organizational capacity. This is
currently provided, to some extent, by formal intergovernmental organizations such
as the United Nations and its functional agencies. Yet national governments, acting
alone or in collaboration, play an even more significant role. Furthermore, within
those governments, bureaucracies whose mandate is primarily "domestic," or at
least is usually perceived as such, are responsible for the promotion, monitoring,

Raymond F. Hopkins is Associate Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College. The
research reported here was conducted while the author was a Guggenheim Fellow and a Fellow
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. He gratefully
acknowledges helpful comments by Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Robert Rothstein on an
earlier version of this article delivered at the American Political Science Association Meetings in
September 197 5 at San Francisco. The constructive suggestions of two anonymous referees are
also acknowledged with thanks.
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and regulation of a wide variety of activities whose scope is international. This
suggests not only that the distinction between foreign and domestic policy has
become blurred-as many observers have suggested-but that the concept of international organization should be broadened. We should think of "international
organization" as including those officials who are part of the organizational networks that perform international functions, whether they are formally in international or domestic bureaucracies, within governments or in the private sector.
The United States, because of its vast resources and international ties, is a
good case to investigate in order to assess the validity of this proposition. In this
essay, I focus particularly on US governmental officials, although their links with
non-governmental organizations are also taken into consideration. After examining
the theoretical concerns that led me to study "domestic" US bureaucrats as
"international" officials I then report evidence that supports five general propositions:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Officials in the US government "domestic" bureaucracies play a significant
international role.
The international responsibilities of these officials seem to be growing.
Some mid-elite officials even have a direct effect on monitoring, promoting,
or regulating resources, services, and information that move internationally.
These officials generally recognize the extent of connectedness among states,
a critical element in managing interdependence.
They use informal networks of intra- and intergovemment coordination;
these networks range in purpose from information sharing to collaboration in
management.

From this I conclude that networks of interconnected behavior among middle level
officials have been, and will continue to be, an important force in performing
international management tasks. This is especially true in areas of food and energy
policy where conventional foreign-domestic distinctions no longer make sense.

I Theoretical perspectives
A shift in attention
Until recently international policy focused on nation states and the formal
organizations they created. Recognition of the importance of transnational actors,
such as the multinational corporation, and transgovernmental actors, particularly
semi-autonomous subdivisions within a government in which "bureaucratic politics" is common, has shifted the attention of scholars to the activities of these
organizations. 1 This emphasis also suggests that the conventional view of inter1 The various organizations so defined may be found in Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,
Jr., eds. Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
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national organizations-as formal, legal bodies with national governments as members and with initiatives carefully limited by law and procedures 2 -may miss
important trends and institutional changes in global structure. 3 Even studies, such
as that by Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, that emphasize the processes of
political behavior rather than formal frameworks focus on the conventional intergovernmental bodies and the relation of national bureaucracies to them. 4 This
focus on formal intergovernmental organizations, hierarchical in character and
limited in authority, is, I believe, unlikely to reveal the critical points of decision
making in international politics where important organizational tasks are performed. These lie to a large extent within the bureaucracies of national governments and multinational firms, often acting in concert.
The justification for proposing a more functional definition of international
organization that would include the organizational actions of national bureaucrats
is based on five trends. First, there has been a weakening of the distinction between
foreign and domestic policy. Second, there has been an expansion of the responsibility of government for social and economic welfare in society. Third, the degree
of interdependence among societies has grown through physical connections such as
environmental pollution and through social connections such as trade and diffusion
of culture. Although this phenomenon is not new, sensitivities of societies to each
other have increased as supplies of key resources-credit, food, oil-were in short
supply for various reasons beginning in the 1970s. Fourth, technical judgments
made by specialists have become increasingly important in making policy decisions.
And, finally, the planned transfer of technology has become a major avenue for
accelerating growth in late-developing countries. Such growing transfers, carried out
by national governments, necessarily involve expertise and bureaucratic capacity
residing outside foreign ministries and state department offices. Taken together
these trends provide the basis for greater international involvement of national
government bureaucracies.
Defining international organization as including the coordinated activity and
operations within the bureaucracies of domestic government agencies and large
corporations is unconventional. However, such activity, as it deals with the same
problem as do formal international organizations, may be more important for the
monitoring, regulation, and promotion of transnational resource flows and collec1972). The multinational firm is discussed in Ramond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay (New York:
Basic Books, 1971). On transgovemmental actors see Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr.,
"Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations," World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 1
(October 1974): 55-60.
2 See, for instance, the use of the term "international organization" in the various essays in
International Organization: Politics and Process, edited by Leland M. Goodrich and David A.
Kay (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1973).
3 Alex Inkeles argues there is a growing global convergence of many social and economic
patterns, a growth of connectedness and interdependence and a continuation of existing
nation-states with their unique organizational patterns. See Inkeles, "The Emerging Social
Structure of the World," World Politics, 27 (July 1975): 467-95.
4 Robert Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973). esp. pp. 1-15.
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tive benefits. Food, energy, finance, communication, clean environment, economic
growth, and technology development and diffusion are principal areas of human
activity transcending national boundaries. For each, I suggest, global management
occurs de facto in decentralized but occasionally coordinated frameworks that
constitute an important part of the global political system. Such frameworks,
though generally loose and unstable, might be considered incipient "regimes" or
institutionalized patterns of behavior and expectations whose effects serve to
regulate activities that reach beyond and are often out of the control of any one or
even a small number of national actors. 5

The scholarly heritage
This view has much in common with that of functionalists who looked for
the early growth of international institutions in the areas of welfare such as health,
education, and food. David Mitrany, for instance, argued that the role of functional
international agencies would grow in response to world exigencies, and this
eventually would force greater global political cooperation. However, in spite of
considerable growth since World War II in functional agencies-in the United
Nations system and outside it, such as the IMF-the capacity of these agencies has
expanded less rapidly than have the problems over which they have some jurisdiction. 6 And with the decline of superpower influence in conventional intergovernmental bodies, there has been a reluctance to take or assign problems to
these organizations. 7
In the 1950s and 1960s Ernst Haas and other neo-functionalists offered a
second perspective that proposed revised explanations to understand and predict
the growth of supra-national institutions and the occurrence of integration. In their
analyses dynamic activity based on initiatives by various interstate organizations
and on necessary negotiations among states would lead to growth in organizational
capacity at the international level.8

5 John Gerard Ruggie and Ernst B. Haas refer to such networks as "international regimes"
responsible for searching problems, establishing norms, defining rights and redefining choices.
These are implicit in the general management functions that informal bureaucratic elite
networks may be assuming. See "International Responses to Technology," International Organization, 29 (Summer 1974): 557-61; 570-83; 852-76.
6 There are no doubt exceptions to this generalization, perhaps in handling certain health
problems. Nevertheless, the increased capacity Mitrany looked for does not seem to have
occurred, as recent UNESCO program evaluations, for instance, suggest. See David Mitrany,A
Working Peace System (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943).
7 The US in 1975 withheld funds from UNESCO, and successfully urged that questions such as
international food reserves be handled outside the United Nations framework. International
energy, food, and commodity problems in 1974-75 were addressed largely outside the UN in
bilateral talks, in regional meetings, in working parties on new international economic order
concerns and in new bodies such as the International Energy Agency.
8 See Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958) and
Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). Other authors with
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Most recently a third perspective has developed regarding the development of
international regimes. Various scholars have proposed that international organizational and policy tasks be viewed broadly and that growth in task performance be
studied within networks of collaboration among national elites as well as at the
supra-national level. Max Beloff some time ago noted the growth of linkages among
national governments' bureaucracies, a trend begun during World War II. Cox and
Jacobson emphasized the role of such bureaucracies (representative sub-systems) in
their studies of international organizations. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye
outlined the process by which transgovernmental coalitions could and did perform
a variety of international management functions, and Ernst Haas and John Ruggie
have proposed that such task performance may be the basis for current and future
international regimes to handle global problems of interdependence. 9
The focus on domestic government bureaucracy in this article is a conscious
extension of this last perspective. It looks at senior officials in "domestic" agencies
as transgovernmental bureaucrats to see how far the requisites of policy making
require them to confront international concerns and deal with foreign bureaucrats.
My proposal is that since growth in international organizational capacity at the
supra-national level has been unimpressive, perhaps it has occurred through
cooperation of existing bureaucracies within states.

The focus on the US
I have focused on the United States to explore this proposal initially because
of its congeniality as a research site, because it has such a large bureaucracy and
because it has had a heavy involvement in international affairs since World War II.
The US bureaucracy, I hope to show, plays an international role in two respects.
First, it participates in transgovernmental networks that serve to regulate
various functional activities. As such the US case is one instance of a general
phenomenon of collaboration among national bureaucracies that constitutes an
international policy network. Domestic policies, border arrangements, and cooperation in international fora are coordinated through interstate collaboration or
bargaining in ways that regulate transnational activity such as trade, migration,
technology transfer, and the regulation of business. Second, the US plays a special
role by undertaking managerial functions that are conventionally thought of as the
proper role of intergovernmental organizations, though seldom if ever performed
(at least not effectively). In this respect, the US is relatively unique, performing a
role analogous to that of the colonial administrations of former European empires,

neo-functionalist perspectives include Joseph Nye, Jr., Leon Lindberg, Phillipe Schmitter, and
James P. Sewall.
• See Max Beloff, New Dimensions of Foreign Policy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961); Cox
and Jacobson; Keohane and Nye, World Politics; and Ernst Haas and John B. Ruggie, eds.,
"International Responses." I am grateful to an anonymous referee for reminding me of the
historical development of this intellectual perspective.
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but carrying out its role within the legal framework of a system of sovereign states
rather than an empire. This second role may have occurred as a natural extension of
the United States' international predominance and involvement after World War II.
As the US position declines relatively, however, the unique role played by US
national bureaucracies becomes both clearer and less certain. Indeed, the shift in
economic interdependence has created problems for the continuation of the US's
role as a surrogate for international bureaucratic activity. In food, for instance, the
stabilizing and security functions played by US government grain reserves in the
1950s and 1960s were ended by a change in US domestic policy. Subsequently, the
US has sought to shift to consumer countries some of the costs of this international
benefit previously managed by US bureaucracy. In energy, portions of the global
management role of US-based multinationals have been assumed by both an
expansion of domestic bureaucracy and, to a far lesser extent, the newly created
International Energy Agency. The latter is dependent on US corporate and government organizations for information, analysis, and task performance. Still the unique
role of US bureaucracy in performing international tasks may be declining. This is
accompanied by an effort to prevent the role from shifting to the more universal
organizations seen to be captured by a poor country majority. This may explain in
part the US effort to turn to ad hoc international groups to handle problems, such
as the Group of Twenty in monetary affairs.
The reality of interdependence for the United States is not new. The Department of Defense, for instance, has long been sensitive to developments in weapons
in the USSR, adjusting its requirements accordingly. But both the physical and
societal (policy-shaped) dependence of the US seems to have grown considerably
since 1950, as has international interdependence more generally. 10 Yet for many
the degree to which the US domestic situation regarding food, energy, and inflation
could be affected by policy decisions taken abroad has been surprising. As Henry
Kissinger was induced to say in late 1974:
The traditional agenda of international affairs-the balance among major
powers, the security of nations-no longer defines our perils or our possibilities. To some extent we have mastered many of the familiar challenges of
diplomacy. Yet suddently we are witnessing a new threat to the governability
of national societies and to the structure of international stability. A crisis
threatens the world's economic system.11

10 The recent growth of interdependence and international transactions has been traced among
others by Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Interdependence: Some Long-term Trends and
Recent Changes," International Organization, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1974): 1021-34. Robert
O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. also discuss types of interdependence in their
paper, "Organizing for Global Environmental and Resource Independence," Report of the
Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy,
Appendix I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976).
11 "Toward a Global Community," speech by Henry Kissinger before the Indian Council on
World Affairs, New Delhi, October 28, 1974, Department of State PR 445, p. 5.
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The management of global affairs
The proposition that capacity and responsibility for performing organizational functions of international management may be growing within national
bureaucracy, notably bureaucracies assigned domestic functional tasks, implies
broader conclusions. The shaping of world order, it suggests, will increasingly
be affected by the actions of functionally specialized officials in domestic
bureaucracies. In an increasingly complex and interdependent international
system, 12 those with most leverage will be influential in determining outcomes. But where are the leverage points in the contemporary international system? To a large extent the traditional answer seems accurate: they lie in the key
foreign policy posts in nation-states. In the United States, President Ford, Secretary
of State Kissinger, and other key elites set broad policy. But there is a second level
of influence in governments where the complexities of individual international
issue-areas are more fully grasped and resolved. For many substantive issues this tier
does not lie, I believe, principally, in central executive offices such as the State
Department or the White House, nor in formal international organizations staffs.
Rather it is found in the domestic operating agencies that deal with particular
choices that affect problems of international or global concern.
Data to test empirically such influence and change in the global system are
generally unobtainable. The relevant investigations would not be tolerated by the
governments and individuals whose behavior and thoughts would need to be
observed. In the absense of such data, nevertheless, I argue that officials in domestic
agencies are likely to have leverage because they have more secure budgets, long
accepted legal authority for actions promoting domestic welfare (now increasingly
linked with international activity), close working ties with domestic and international business officials, powerful, if latent, interest group support, and day-today operating command over the details of transnational flows of resources.
During the era of intense international hostility after World War II, the
Defense Department and its closely related industrial organizations exercised a key
influence over the decisions which shaped arms development, the formation of
common defense collaboration in NATO, and the dispersal of weapons systems
around the world. Decisions were made for reasons related to perceived threat,
technological development, alliance politics, and budget constraints. The consequences were often different than the purposes.
A similar situation can be argued for food and energy issues. The US
Agriculture Department was the prime actor in supporting, managing, and even
supplying the research, technical assistance, financial incentives, market regulation
and distribution of food for global needs in the post-World War II period. While

12 For a discussion of complexity, interdependence, and decomposability in political systems,
see Garry D. Brewer and Ronald D. Brunner, Organized Complexity (New York: Free Press,
1971) and Ernst Haas, "Is there a hole in the whole?" International Organization, Vol. 29, No.
3 (Summer 1975): 852-68.
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AID was a critical agent for drawing upon, directing, and paying for some of
Agriculture's resources, department programs and personnel were the key managers
of food production and distribution systems that provided the resource base for
US global food policy.
The flow of oil into industrialized states has long been managed by executives
of a few global firms under loose government constraints. They have produced and
controlled intelligence, shaped options, collaborated tacitly, and negotiated for
prices with producing countries and for tax concessions in home and consuming
countries. With the oil embargo of 1973 and the dramatic OPEC price hike,
consuming countries began to assume greater management responsibility through
domestic and international actions. But the network of management still is heavily
dependent upon corporate executives. The International Energy Agency (IEA), for
instance, has four Working Groups. Two of these-one on uncovering critical
information on firm operations and another on emergency sharing-have requested
and rely heavily upon reports prepared by corporate groups and continuing consultation with these groups. This new international organization, like many others,
tends to be principally a structured forum for management networks crossing
national boundaries to create new and more legally binding collaborative practices.
The points ofleverage remain in the key posts in domestic bureaucracy.

Theoretical conclusions
My central analytical conclusion is that many "functional" policy issues that
are interconnected internationally, because they usually require technical judgment,
long lead time, and large bureaucratic regulation and because they are deeply linked
with domestic objectives, tend to be defined and resolved to a larger extent than
conventional "diplomatic" questions by senior executives within the "domestic"
bureaucracies of government. Although "international" officials often have sought to
influence issues, as in food and energy, the ad hoc and often informal interdepartmental and transgovernmental meetings which they attend almost always rely
heavily on the research, regulatory powers, and promotional resources controlled
by domestic government bureaucracies. The weakness of foreign policy officials in
efforts to coordinate or control such problems has been uncovered in many case
studies. 13 In addition, while studies have familiarized us with how domestic
bureaucratic interests shape an individual "player's" view of policy, and how
internal organizational norms define his role, we have not fully explored how the
external exigencies of the global system impact on his views and role. This is
especially the case for those officials in posts outside the foreign policy bureaucracy .14
13 See, for instance, William I. Bacchus, "Obstacles to Reform in Foreign Affairs," Orbis, Vol.
18, No. 1 (Spring 1974): 266-76.
14 See Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1974).
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Discretion in international politics (i.e., deciding who gets what, etc.) often
lies with those officials in domestic agencies whose decisions directly affect the
flow of resources distributed by international market and negotiation mechanisms.
In the case of global food supplies, for example, US Department of Agriculture
executives negotiate levels of grain exports with officials of the EEC, Japan, and the
Soviet Union, while agribusiness officials negotiate the terms, timing, and transport
arrangements of sale. Both negotiations reflect judgments about market prices and
supply-demand situations. The areas of energy and finance have similar management transactions among government officials and oil and bank corporation executives. The activities of major American banks in recycling petrodollars during 1974
required close collaboration with the US Treasury as well as with the financial
managers of OPEC investments. In sum, within broad policy guidelines, the management of global political problems, especially those of a non-military nature, resides
primarily in decentralized, partially-connected networks of executives in both
national governments and private multinational business. Day-to-day functional
government responsibilities in the US for energy, food, and monetary policies lie in
operating agencies such as FEA, ERDA, Interior, Agriculture, and Treasury. By
focusing on the actions and views of bureaucrats in such positions we should be
able to discover to what extent such ad hoc systems of behavior based on
innovative and informal roles and norms manage global problems through transgovernmental relations.
I have undertaken to study activities of these bureaucracies and the views of
one group of such possible global resource and environmental managers-those
residing in US "domestic" government bureaucracies dealing with food and energy.
If coalitions of such bureaucrats, crossing national and corporate boundaries, have
been vital in managing global tasks, such as food and energy production and
distribution, a number of important questions can be posed. Will future "growth"
of international organization in response to increased interdependence occur primarily within nations rather than at the supra-national level? Will domestic government bureaucrats become responsible for world welfare, developing international
outlooks and commitments as they cope with interdependent problems through
transgovernmental relations? Although I cannot provide definitive answers to these
questions, I hope this study will at least call attention to the value of the somewhat
unconventional perspective on international organization entailed by such questions, as well as shed some light on the extent to which US domestic bureaucracy
has been performing international management tasks.

II International activities of "domestic" bureaucracies
It is certainly true that there has been a growing incidence of these
other departments outside the State Department going off on their own. This
has been a chronic problem. How do you keep these people who often have
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no idea about foreign policy from doing things completely uncoordinated
with a President's policy?
George Kennan (March 1975) 15

Departments and agencies of the US government whose mandate is principally and sometimes exclusively domestic can and have performed activities and
assumed responsibilities in international areas. Three conditions have prompted
such involvement: the dependence of their policy goals on what happens outside
the US, development of special skills and responsibilities of interest to foreigners,
and the value of benefits they can provide in support of foreign policy.

Conditions for domestic bureaucracy involvement
First, dependence among states has promoted international activities in
domestic bureaus. This may be a physical dependence as with the effects of
pollution, or dependence based on social and economic policy arrangements, as
with linked monetary or marketing arrangements. In either instance when domestic
policy objectives are affected by policies or events (e.g., bad harvests) in other
countries, greater international involvement tends to follow. These relationships to
foreign actions need to be taken into account if objectives are to be met. There
have been cases where the mutual dependence of domestic policies in several
countries has not been fully accounted for in domestic policy in one country with
"bad" results. The 1973 US embargo on soybeans, for instance, a step taken
because of domestic considerations at the urging of the Cost of Living Council, is
generally considered to have had very negative repercussions in Japan and Europe
where decades of effort to establish the US as a reliable supplier were wasted.
Occasionally, emphasis on international considerations has led to undesired domestic results as well. The Russian grain sales in 1972 and the subsequent continuation
of acreage controls in the US until 1973 (after the winter wheat crop was planted)
contributed substantially to the inflationary rise in US domestic prices. 16 The
embargo on oil to the US from Middle Eastern Arab States in 1973-74 underlined
US dependence on foreign energy. Net oil imports have risen from virtually zero in
1950 to nearly 40 percent of domestic consumption in 1974-75. One result is that
the "uncontrolled" price of US domestic oil is effectively set overseas by the OPEC
cartel. This situations is analogous, but with a reversal of dependence, to that in the
1960s with respect to grain prices. Former Secretary of Agriculture Freeman recalls
meeting with representatives of the other major exporters (Canada, Argentina,

15 Comment by Professor Kennan during a discussion of the research for this paper at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
16 This is not only a widely held view among government officials, but analysis of trade data
tends to confirm it. Arthur Mackie, for instance, found the USSR, as a very inconsistent
importer, largely responsible for the US price rise. See "International Dimensions of Agricultural Prices," Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, July 1974. Of course, a desire for
higher prices for US farmers was a likely factor also, especially in the delay in lifting controls.
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Australia) in response to US exporters' complaints that other countries were cutting
prices. "I told them either they held their prices in line with the US prices or I
would put US surpluses on the market. They all got in line quickly." 17
The development of US dependence on foreign supplies, prices, and regulatory
actions, with its potential to affect domestic policy, often occurred without full
appreciation of its scope or possible ramifications. US farm surpluses in the 1950s
and 1960s, for instance, provided collective global benefits, international food
security, and a price stabilization mechanism. Yet the primary force sustaining
surplus policy was the objective of assisting US farmers. Nevertheless, international
commodities such as coffee, cocoa, and sisal, not "managed" as an outgrowth of US
domestic policy, fluctuated widely in price during the 1960s, while grain and
cotton prices, which were regulated by US domestic policy, were comparatively
steady in international price and were in assured supply. A somewhat parallel role
to that of the USDA in grain was played by the multinational oil firms who
dominated decisions affecting international oil prices and the flow of supplies. 18
They provided the world with relatively cheap oil, while resisting efforts of
producers to capture more benefits, as they did with Mossadegh in Iran in 1953.
The short supply situation of both food and energy that occurred in the
1970s led to two changes in government organizations. In Agriculture an export
review system was set up in 1974 that monitored all large grain sales with the power
to veto sales not anticipated or which threatened to drive up domestic prices
without commensurate benefits. This system, run by the Foreign Agricultural
Service, also protected regular foreign buyers by making their expected US supplies
more secure. The Review Committee for this operation also works closely with the
newly formed World Food Council in assessing international supplies.
An even greater organizational response has occurred in the energy field with
of two new agencies. The Federal Energy Administration (FEA)
creation
the
established in 1974 is responsible for developing short-term (5-10 year) policy and
managing allocation and price controls. The Energy Research and Development
Agency (ERDA), set up in 1975, is responsible for longer term solutions to the
"energy crisis." Both have international divisions and participate in the new
international organization of energy consumers, the International Energy Agency
(IEA), which is designed to coordinate the efforts of 18 states for short- and
long-term energy needs, including emergency energy sharing in the event of another
oil boycott.
These organizational developments have done two things. They have shifted
government a greater burden for managing US resources and markets and
the
to
shifted (or tried to) to international institutions a portion of the burden for
managing resource allocations and paying the costs of achieving an assured resource

Interview with Orville Freeman, April 23, 1975.
On the growth of international oil activity see Multinational Corporations and United States
Foreign Policy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Committee
on Foreign Relations, US Senate, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973).
17
18
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supply. In the case of food the US has tried to shift some responsibility to other
countries; in the case of oil, the major multinational firms, largely US based, have
tried to shift burdens to the several governments within whose jurisdiction they
operate. Large oil firms like Exxon have welcomed government intervention to the
extent that governments assume responsibility for allocating tight supplies or
funding expensive research, though they have resisted government management that
might affect their discretion over prices and profits. 19
The second reason that domestic bureaucracies play an international role is
that they may control certain special skills or exercise key domestic responsibilities.
For instance, the Department of the Interior carried out the first full geological
survey of Saudi Arabia, paid for by that government. The Saudis apparently felt the
US Geological Survey was the organization best equipped to help them discover and
assess their non-hydrocarbon assets. Another special resource is research. Both the
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and the Energy Development and Research
Administration (ERDA) carry out research with potentially large benefits overseas.
In ARS, research is being carried out to determine how to prevent corn and other
grain from cracking or deteriorating in shipment. The ARS laboratory in Rotterdam
examines specimens of US shipments when they arrive. Positive results could lead
to fewer losses in transport and more satisfied overseas consumers. Information is
yet a third bureaucratic product desired by others. The USDA worldwide crop
information and forecasting service is the best information system in the world and
is widely used by multinational firms and agricultural departments throughout the
world as a basis for policy evaluation. The Bureau of Mines (Interior) has produced
the Mineral Yearbook- "The standard of the world, not just the United
States" 20 -and provided important energy data through FEA to the new International Energy Agency.
Sometimes a domestic mandate will lead to international involvement. In
order to begin to protect earnings from domestic resources and encourage exploration in the US, in 1959 the Office of Oil and Gas was established in the Interior
Department. By limiting the import of foreign oil the US not only served its major
purpose, which is to protect domestic producers, but also established some modest
capacity to affect world demand and price. The office also proved to be a major
avenue for intergovernmental contact, as well as a device for emergency preparations and industry liaison. The quota system kept oil costs to importing nations
lower and created bureaucratic machinery for responding to emergencies, at the
cost of depleting US domestic supplies and thereby increasing long-term US
vulnerability. Of course, since oil prices were fixed through corporate-producer
country bargaining, the impact of market forces on price arrangements was heavily
muted anyway by the monopoly bargaining power of first one side and then the
Interview with Mr. Kleppe, Vice-President, Exxon International, April 22, 1973.
The quotation is from John D. Morgan, Jr., Bureau of Mines, Department of the
Interior, in "Global Scarcities in an Interdependent World" Hearings before the subcommittee
on Foreign Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, May 9,
1974, p. 103.
19

20
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other. When power shifted to the producers as world demand grew, greater control
over aspects of corporate activity was begun. One such step was to transfer price
determination. FEA, the major successor to the old oil and gas office, now has the
responsibility, exercised largely by one person in the domestic part of the agency,
to set the price at which intra-corporate transactions take place. Since these
decisions affect the "profits" of foreign corporate affiliates as well as the stakes of
US corporations, transfer pricing decisions are carefully watched by corporations
and other countries.
In a similar fashion international consequences grew out of US domestic
policy in agriculture and food. After World War II, the US commodity price
support system, begun during the depression, led to growing stockpiles of agricultural products held by the government in the CCC. These surpluses, which
existed until 1972, had a number of beneficial international results. They promoted
price stability for key commodities in the world market and provided food security
for countries with chronic cyclical deficits. Under the surplus disposal/food aid
program begun in 1954 (PL480), $25 billion worth of concessional sales or gifts of
agricultural goods has occurred-amounting to 30 percent of the value of total
exports during the 1960s, though below 5 percent in fiscal 1974. 21 The surpluses
may also have aided consumers world-wide by keeping prices low. The Agriculture
Department maintained the Food for Peace Program administered by the Foreign
Agricultural Service and the CCC, gave support and direction to F AO activities, and
conducted research and intelligence operations globally. Such food policies and
USDA management and service functions in the 1950s and 1960s, while motivated
principally by a desire to assist domestic producers, provided substantial international benefits, enjoyed by foreign countries universally at virtually no direct
cost.
A third basis for the international involvement of domestic bureaucrats has been
the support of State Department or White House foreign policy goals. These
goals are often ones accepted by and promoted by the UN and its various agencies,
and involve functions similar to those performed by formal international organization
experts. The study of the Sahelian drought effect by Public Health Service doctors
or the stationing of US technicians in Israel to insure early warning of Egyptian
military moves are cases of US technical expertise carrying out international
functions, that WHO or peacekeeping forces might under other conditions carry
out.
The provision of services or goods overseas, such as technical assistance or
aid, has been largely in collabc;>ration with foreign policy officials. AID has
established Participating Agency Service Agreements (PASA) with a number of
departments-Labor, Agriculture, HEW, Justice and so forth-to pay for the activities of US bureaucrats in technical assistance programs. These programs usually
draw on either AID appropriations or PL-480 counterpart funds. Major collabora-

21

See US Agricultural Exports under Public Law 480, USDA, October 1974.
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tion in coal research in Poland is funded in this way. lilternational cultural
exchanges, food aid (increasingly used as a fungible replacement for dwindling
regular aid), and scientific collaboration have all been carried out by domestic
agencies to further foreign policy aims. 22 The recently established bilateral commissions with Israel, lildia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the USSR have also
drawn US bureaucrats into more international affairs. As one senior Agriculture
official assigned to a commission remarked: "We could never justify the time and
effort on this commission activity unless it was to support our foreign policy. It
certainly is hard to justify in terms of US or global welfare calculations." 23

International activities
The complete scope and range of international activities in domestic agencies
are hard to document systematically. Nevertheless, I have attempted to catalogue
some of their activities along with data on the size and scope of programs. Table 1
is based on responses and internal definitions of "international" developed by each
department or agency in response to the Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy and in State Department authorizations hearings. It provides a quick sketch of some of the domestic agencies'
international activities.
The specific international involvement of domestic bureaucracies may be
specialized within a key office. In lilterior, for instance, there are offices for
international activities in every major bureau except lildian Affairs. And there is an
international office organized to support the Secretary in his international responsibilities and to attempt to coordinate activities within lilterior and with State.
These offices handle ad hoc international activity and generally do not have global
overview or direct responsibilities. Until recently most of lilterior's international
activities have been in supplying specialized skills to selected foreign countries. With
minerals and energy increasingly viewed as limited, depletable resources, however,
lilterior's interests in and attention to such policy areas as Law of the Sea and the
access rights of foreigners to US energy and mineral resources have markedly
increased. 24
In other agencies and departments such as ERDA, FEA, and Treasury, one or
two divisions may be established to deal explicitly with foreign economic affairs.
Within the Office of the Secretary in Treasury, for instance, two divisions were
created in a reorganization in 1974, each headed by an Assistant Secretary. The
long established branch for International Affairs (OASIA) was regrouped along with

22 According to Ambassador Edwin Martin, who headed preparations for the Rome World
Food Conference, food aid is largely fungible and can be a good substitute in serving diplomatic
ends for other aid, a point he made in an interview December 9, 1974.
23 Interview with Quentin West, Administrator of Economic Research Service (ERS) in
Agriculture, July 13, 1975.
24 These claims were made by Ms. Wright and Mr. Sturgill, Office of the Secretary, Department of Interior, October, 1974.
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a new division for Trade and Energy Affairs. These divisions have their own
research, functional, and specialized country subdivisions.
The most internationalized "domestic" agency I encountered was in Agriculture. Two developments there are relevant. Like Treasury, Agriculture has long had
an international division. This has consisted principally of the Foreign Agriculture
Service which operates directly overseas with its own personnel system covering
over 100 countries. Unlike labor, cultural, and commercial attaches, the agricultural
attache abroad is appointed by and reports to his domestic department and is not
directly under the State Department (although the attache is nominally and
functionally under the direction of the State Department's embassy when abroad).
The first important development in Agriculture was the merging of domestic
commodity support programs and the foreign division under a single assistant
secretary in 1969. While this move was done for idiosyncratic reasons, it has been
quickly accepted as natural. 25 The second development occured in 1973, when the
Economic Research Service (ERS) was reorganized. This eliminated the foreign
subdivisions of ERS per se and put country analysis under two functional divisions,
commodities and natural resources. As a result, for instance, economic analysts
specializing in grain are now expected to be knowledgeable about all relevant
factors, including international ones, that impinge on supply and demand. "We
expect a grain person to know about the weather in Russia or China these days." 26
Those familiar with the major clientele interests and the typical rural rnidwest
backgrounds of Agriculture Department personnel would be hard pressed to explain
these changes as due to natural internationalist perspectives of the Department. The
organizational changes above are similar to those that have taken place in multinational firms. As multinationals became more international in operations they
have tended to do away with a separate international division. Instead the whole
organization operates with an international perspective, every unit forming its
international outlook based on its own functions. 27 That the Department of
Agriculture seems to be moving in a similar direction is striking.
The growth in these activities has been neither consistent nor coordinated.
Frequently, autonomous rather than coordinated steps are taken by specialized
agencies with a large science and technology component, notably AEC (now
ERDA), NASA, and NOAA. They have conducted extensive programs of international collaboration and assistance. Project Plowshare of the AEC, promoting
"peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs ) is a particularly dramatic case of autono-

25 After Palmby was passed over by Nixon as Secretary of Agriculture, he agreed to become an
assistant secretary if the division he headed combined the divisions that previously were
coordinated at the under-secretary level-namely FAS and ASCS.
26 Interview with Lyle Schertz, deputy administrator, ERS, July 18, 1975.
27 The conclusion of Louis T. Wells, Jr. is that as a firm's foreign business grows, it results in
the end of the international division. See "The Multinational Business Enterprise: What kind of
International Organization?" in Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Transnational
Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 102.
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Intra-government
collaboration

Inter-government
collaboration

Agriculture

International Grain Reserveinteragency committee
(Also 14 other interagency
committees)

International Wheat Council;
PL 480 Food Aid
Program; and informal
marketing agreements

Prepublication sharing of data
and analysis with FAO; and
codex Alimentarius

Treasury

Foreign economic policy;
coordinate economic
implications of global resources (commodities, food.
oil, Law of the Sea; on 24
interagency committees)

Work with Group of 20 on
finance; Saudi-Arabian
bilateral commission

Review and serve on the BoardIMF; World Bank, IDA, etc.

Health,
Education
and Welfare

US cultural
programs-coordinate with
State; also nutritional
programs

Comparative research
USSR; Japan, Poland

Delegates to and cooperation with
UNESCO/WHO/OECD/NATO, e.g., detail
of personnel from the Center for
Disease Control to WHO ($800,000).

Interior

Interagency committee on
scientific and technical
exchange, Law of the Sea
review

International assistance in
Bureau of Mines, Fish and
Wildlife, etc., Survey of
Saudi Arabia; collaboration
with Canada (power) Mexico
(water)

Sponsored energy conference,
1975 jointly with UN; Informal
leadership nongovernmental
international professional
associations

Bilateral Energy Research
Japan, UK, USSR,
Poland

Strong role in IAEA and in IEA
working group on long term
cooperation, also NATO

ERDA**

Labor

-1:..
c::i

Old AEC activities; nuclear
safety; proliferation;
Law of the Sea
With State and AID on
Cultural and Technical
Exchange

Technical consultation
France, UK, Japan
ministerial level consultation

International organization
collaboration

....~
("I,

~

....-.
~

a
~
.._

;::i

Representation to ILO; OECD (manpower committee)

a

~
~

;::i

N.

....
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~
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Transportation
(including FAA)

Interdepartmental
committees with State
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Implementation of
international Fishery Conventions-Uniform aviation
standards; exchange of data;
Canada, Germany, Japan.
Work with France on
pollution free "new towns"

Involved with ICAO

d

~

HUD

With State on UN
Economic Committee

EPA

Coordinate with StateOceans, Environment, and
Science

US-Soviet Environmental
Agreement

Work with UNEP
NATO-Challenges of Modern
Society

Numerous interagency
committees on economics(commercial) and
weather in NOAA

East-west trade negotiations
scientific bilateral exchange

With UN Industry Programs,
Maritime Organizations, WMO

Commerce

~

~

UN agencies

~
~

0

;i

...-·..,
~

<":I

i:::,-

.::

""I

~

.::
<":I

FEA

With staff on international
energy program; setting of
transfer prices for multinational firm movements of
goods

Bilateral work with producing and consuming countries

With IEA; data sharing,
program collaboration

Justice***

Anti-trust coordination
with State over oil and
MNE activity generally

International drug
suppression

UN drug and legal activities;
immigration consultation

State

Nearly every interagency
committee with international
policy matters (lO0's)

255 Foreign Posts (1974)
Embassies or missions

Representation through
1.0. Bureau to all major
groups especially the UN

--

*Based on data in State/USIA Authorizations, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 93rd
Congress, March 11 and 12, 1974 (Washington: U.S. Government Printer, 1974), pp. 10-11, and communications to the
Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, May to September, 1974 in response to a
survey-type inquiry from Commissioner Murphy. I wish to thank the Commission for allowing me to review these files.
**Data largely from AEC records.
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Department or
Agency

Number of international personnel

Overseas US
personnel

Overseas travel (1972)
total passengers*

International
activities budget

Overseas
expenditures

Agriculture

901 (in Foreign Agr.
Service only; not
ARS, ERS, etc.)

181

3,950

1.6 billion (If
1 billion in food
aid and work in ARS,
IRS, etc. is included)

24 million (exeludes food aid)

Treasury

400 (approx.)

151

1,337

No estimate

11 million

Health,
Education
and Welfare

403 full time;
5 36 man years
(approx. 1200
people involved)

14

4,383

31 million

427 million
(includes grants)

Interior

190 man years

15

1,527

900 thousand

61 million

ERDA**

64
(from AEC)

11

317

No estimate

8 million (likely
to grow rapidly)

....~

876 thousand

....s:::i

Labor

No estimate

Transportation
(including FAA)

Internat'l. Prog.
office 13 people;
Intl. duties 822;
FAA/Coast Guard

(few, perhaps
none)

287

No estimate

~

~

-0

;::s

262

809

33 million (J.P.
office-302
thousand

13 million
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HUD

Office of Int.
Affairs-16 people

1 in Paris

EPA

27

not specified

Commerce

several
hundred

FEA

In t'l. Affairs
staff about
40

no permanent
staff

Justice***

-

-

State

9,438
(authorized
positions)

3,336

58

62
750
14

489 thousand

very small
amounts

1 million
(approx.)

2.9 million

not specified

9.2 million

~
l:l'.:

0

~

(I)

........c..,
(";

~

l:::

not in
existence
5,024
18,448

not specified

not specifiable
for FY 1973 or
1974

-

-

616 million

274 million
(excludes aid)

""I

~

l:::

(";

~

~

*Based on data in State/USIA Authorizations, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United State Senate, 93rd
Congress, March 11 and 12, 1974 (Washington: US Government Printer, 1974), pp. 10-11, and communications to the
Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, May to September, 1974 in response to a
survey-type inquiry from Commissioner Murphy.
**Data largely from AEC records.
***The Justice Department did not respond to Commissioner Murphy's request.
Note: Some of the trips by agency people, e.g., to international meetings, would come from State Department budgets. Thus
commerce is likely to have had more than 14 passengers (7 each way) in 1972. This data is from an unpublished JAO study
conducted in 1972-73 for fiscal year 1972. The Justice figures include over 3,000 people deported as undesirable aliens.
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mous and conflicting foreign policy goals pursued by a "domestic" agency. The
program was eventually stopped by State and ACDA but not until it provided a
justification for India's acquiring nuclear capability. With over 700 international
conferences a year, transnational collegiums of professionals in agriculture, atomic
energy, meteorology, satellites, and health tend to work directly with one another
with little supervision by the foreign policy agencies (basically State) in staffing
conferences, drawing up technical guidelines or reaching consensual decisions.
Funds for international programs in Treasury, Interior, and Agriculture and
other units, with the exception of PASA agreements for technical assistance funded
by AID, are also usually carried in "domestic" budgets. The international affairs
division of 0MB, for example, does not have jurisdiction over, or working knowledge of, the costs and benefits of direct international activities or indirect international consequences of programs outside the "conventionally" designated
agencies including State, AID, and the CIA. 28 Moreover, networks of professionals
across nations, and bilateral cooperation set up under the aegis of bilateral agreements, are seldom monitored or used in calculations by the State Department. 29
Thus centralized direction over direct international activities or the indirect effects
of largely domestic activities has been weak.
Judging by the budget expenses and personnel involved as shown in table 2,
such activities are not insignificant. The State Department's cost for administering
foreign affairs in fiscal 1974 was $317 million. HEW estimated its international
activity programs cost $68 million with about 1,200 employees involved, while
Agriculture spent $34 million alone for its foreign agricultural activity with 900
employees. 30 Estimates for Interior, FEA, and Treasury are more difficult, but
each has 100-200 employees working directly on international affairs. Trend data
are hard to compile due to definitional ambiguity, departmental reorganization, and
the lack of relevant systematic record-keeping in most agencies. In general it
appears that from 1960 to 1970 the Labor Department's international expenditures
increased eightfold, Agriculture's went up almost 10 times, and Commerce 5½,
while the State Department's budget doubled. 31 Overseas travel is another crude
indicator of international activity. A 1972 GSA study of international air travel by
USGA employees (on "government business" and hence paid for by the government) showed that State paid for 18,448 incoming or outgoing passenger trips,
Agriculture-3,954; National Institutes of Health-3,720; Interior-1,527; and

Interview with James Frye, then Director of International Affairs, 0MB, September 1974.
with Nelson Sievering, Jr., then Director, Office of General Scientific Affairs,
State Department and now Assistant Administrator at ERDA, and Robert Sturgill, Office of
International Affairs, Department of the Interior, October 1974.
30 See The Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1975, pp. 134-35, 641 and DHEW Special
Report on International Activities-Action Memorandum, August 5, 1974. Agricultural department expenses exclude technical assistance, commodity stabilization programs, and costs of
economic and agricultural research.
31 I am grateful for this data compiled by Kenneth Oye, Harvard University, March 1973, and
shared with me by Robert 0. Keohane, Stanford University.
28

29 Interviews
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Treasury-1,337. 32 Overseas travel in every agency was subject to budgetary
pressure to cut back beginning in 1969. As a result, although travel has grown, it
has not done so dramatically. Agriculture averaged about $1.4 million spent on
travel in 1960-63; this grew 80 percent by 1970-73 to an average of $2.4 million,
while travel costs were relatively constant. 33 "Official" delegations to international
conferences, for which State normally pays, increased 37 percent from 1967 to
1975 while the proportion spent by State among major agencies climbed from 68
percent to 72 percent. 34 Except for Agriculture, however, we do not have figures
on individuals from domestic agencies who were unofficial delegates at conferences
or who attended informal international conferences. However, if we look at the
1972 travel figures (the year of the GSA study) we see that overseas travel by State
was only about half (53 percent) of total travel by the seven largest departments
excluding Defense (i.e.-the first seven departments in table 3). 35

Table III Trends in overseas stationing of civilian US bureaucrats*
Years
Agency

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1974as
percent
of 1962

State**
Agriculture
Treasury
Interior
HEW
Labor
Justice
Commerce
AEC
FAA-DOT#
NOAA

10,819
186
144
284
143
14
160
408
27
189
12

11,322
230
170
452
221
8
151
338
28
256
15

11,057
311
230
447
218
4
171
323
25
266
22

12,573
433
296
463
381
22
172
197
25
397
24

10,674
331
216
410
182
15
172
152
22
297
19

8,952
296
204
99
112
24
317
98
17
227
17

7,621
255
207
70
62
12
371
84
12
170
19

70
137
144
25
43
86
233
21
44
90
158

*This data refers to all US citizens who are regular government employees posted overseas
(outside US territory) during March of each year above. The data are from the US Civil Service
Commission, Federal Employment Statistics Bulletin (Washington: Bureau of Manpower
Statistics, 1962-1974).
**Includes AID and Peace Corps (1966-1970), but not USIA. Also remember State provides
many services overseas to USG employees posted there by other agencies.
#After 1966 the FAA figures were included in the new Department of Transportation.

32 Data supplied by General Services Administration, Herbert H. Scott, Passenger Transportation Services Branch. Since these figures included dependents, they probably exaggerate the
figures for State. Treasury figures include travel by Federal Reserve and Ex-Im Bank employees.
33 Calculated from data supplied by Warren A. Blight, Deputy Director, Management and
Finance, USDA, November 18, 1974. The small increases in air fares after 1968 do not account
for this rise.
34 Calculated from data supplied by Joseph Nye, Jr., drawn from State Department sources. I
am grateful to Professor Nye for sharing his data with me on official delegation composition. I
have used only figures for Agriculture, HEW, Interior, FEA, AEC, Treasury, Justice and State.
35 Calculated from the 1972 GSA study, footnote 32.
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Since management of commodities or services can occur through "international" meetings of government and corporate officials in Washington or by
phone and letter communications, travel is at best an approximate indicator.
Moreover, data on unofficial meetings in Washington or abroad are not readily
available. Nevertheless, the comments of one Treasury official are telling: "The 707
has done in State; when we want to make sure our views are represented, we just go
on the next flight." 36
The trend toward expansion of international activities by "domestic" US
agencies is not continuous. The figures in table 3 on the overseas posting of various
US personnel suggest a decline in foreign activities after the late I 960s, due to
budgetary pressures and the decline of activity in Southeast Asia. Until then it was
rapidly increasing in many areas, especially agriculture and education. By 1970,
however, US resources were stretched. US capacity to support liquidity in the
international economic system through dollars as a reserve currency was declining,
even though West Germany and other governments collaborated in monetary
management efforts. Overseas activities across the board were forced to decline as
the figures in table 3 indicate, though more so in areas like commercial representation and education than in agriculture, law enforcement, or transportation. In
various domestic departments, including HEW, Agriculture, and Interior the cutback of international activities was partially due to real dollar reductions in PL-480
counterpart funds. 37 Generally, the international activities are the most vulnerable
sector during budget-cutting in agencies where the principal mission is domestic.
However, the plateaus reached in the late 1960s or early 1970s in levels of
international activity by domestic agencies were exceeded in the mid-1970s by
some agencies, though not the State Department. 38 Moreover, new international
trade arrangements and monetary adjustments, new research in energy and agriculture, and participation in new international fora such as the World Food Council
and the International Energy Agency have increased or are likely to increase the
involvement of "domestic" agencies.
These strands of evidence and estimates of activity indicate clearly that
"domestic" bureaucracies do play a significant role in international affairs, in some
36 Treasury official under the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs who asked that his
observation not be attributed.
37 The 1966 International Education Act which would have significantly expanded US
educational activities was never funded. The International Agriculture Development Service,
created in 1964, was reorganized in 1970 and eventually absorbed into the Economic Research
Service. The USDA participants at international meetings grew from 400 in 1956 to about 900
in 1963 and only came close again to this figure in 1970 and 1973. See USDA Participation in
Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental International Meetings, Annual Summary, 1974,
USDA, FAS, January 1975, p. 5. Bilateral cooperation in energy grew, but principally in atomic
energy until 1973. See Herman Pollack and Mich;iel Congdon, "International Cooperation in
Energy Research and Development," Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 6 (Nov. 3,
1974). The data base for even deciding what cooperation among countries would be desirable to
meet the "energy crisis" was considered by the State Department in 1973 as "inadequate."
38 This judgment is based on judgments of several informants, including two in the State
Department and three at 0MB.
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cases with substantial budget and personnel commitments. This international role is
not irreversible, however. Because such activity is usually regarded as secondary to
the main purposes of the agency, it faces an inclination in the agency to receive
disproportionate budget cuts during periods of retrenchment. This certainly was the
case in HEW following Elliot Richardson's departure. 39

The activities of individual officials
The duties and actions of individuals in these domestic bureaucracies are
another source of important clues about the international role of domestic bureaucracy. Thirty-five formal interviews were conducted with administrators from seven
departments or bureaucratic units responsible for food or energy policy: Agriculture, HEW, ERDA, FEA, Interior, Treasury, and 0MB. The sample was drawn
purposively from about one hundred seventy-five executive level political appointees and senior executives (GS 16-18). 40 In addition, I interviewed forty-one
officials informally in the Department of State, NSC, 0MB, Defense, CEA, and
various domestic agencies. 41
International responsibilities were clearly undertaken, if not consciously
acknowledged, by these officials. Seventy-seven percent (27 of 35) indicated they
could make decisions or recommend policies that would "directly affect things in
other countries or foreign firms." The growth of international responsibilities by
domestic agency officials is less easy to demonstrate. Over time data suggest
ambiguous trends, although the expansion of overseas personnel in Treasury,
Agriculture, and Energy areas-while the overall number of personnel was declining-is evidence that growth is occurring in at least some areas. And the supply
scarcity in food and energy has certainly meant that domestic decisions have had a
great impact globally. In general, a growth in responsibility was perceived by
almost every individual I interviewed. And the responsibilities individuals offered as
examples of their international involvement contained a number of newly instituted

39 Interview with Granville Austin, former HEW director for International Affairs, September,
1974.
40 Each department and agency studied was asked to supply a list of senior executives at
GS-16 or above, with information on their length of service. In addition, recent phone books,
an organizational chart (in the case of ERDA), and listings in the "plum" book-a list of
unscheduled and policy positions outside the Civil Service-supplemented the data from
agencies' personnel offices. In two cases resignations led to selection of a successor to the post
chosen or to an alternative selection. I made an effort to interview a variety of types from
office directors (usually GS-16) to assistant secretaries, from younger less experienced persons
(age 33 was the youngest with three years in government), to senior officials (one with 33 years
of government service).
41 Eighteen officials with responsibility for food and 25 in energy were initially chosen for
formal study. Interviews were completed with 17 in food and 18 in energy. Two people-one in
each category-were not interviewed because they seemed less suitable than I initially believed;
they had little policy responsibility and they were in charge of explicit assistance type
international programs. Among the others there were no explicit refusals; the overall response
rate was 85.4 percent.
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tasks. Nine of the ten international activities listed below (table 4) began after
1970.

Table IV Some international activities of domestic bureaucracy officials
1) Formulation of basic features of an international food reserve system in an
intra-government committee and, at times, at meetings at the International Wheat Council
(London).
2) Increase research aimed at preventing deterioration of food in transport.
3) Setting transfer prices for petroleum movements.
4) Enforcement of FDA standards on imports through informal agreements with other
governments and through blanket rejection of commodities to force changes in overseas
standards.
5) Approval of security arrangements for nuclear power plants exported from the US to
other countries.
6) Encouragement of US refinery expansion through adjustments of import levies on refined
petroleum products.
7) Review of common floor price policy for oil imports into IEA countries with emphasis on
finding a "right" price.
8) Determining that sales of grain to specific countries exceeded "projections" and ordering
these held up, e.g., sales to Mexico and Portugal in 1974.
9) Formulation of rules for limiting foreign investment in US energy resources. Rules in the
United Kingdom were being reviewed.
10) Determining whether export subsidies or other policies of foreign governments amount
to "dumping" of goods coming to the US-a finding which legally requires US counteraction.

Domestic responsibilities were the principal mandate of most individuals
interviewed. Nevertheless, the proliferation of the "little state departments," as the
foreign divisons of FEA, Interior, HEW, and so forth have been called, has
expanded the capacity of these agencies to act internationally. While some of the
"domestic" officials interviewed held posts in the international divisions of these
departments and agencies, this was true for less than half (13 or 37 percent) of
those interviewed. Moreover, the interests and views of those in international wings
coincided generally with those of the larger bureaucracy that housed them; with the
exception of only two individuals, no international division official expressed views
that contradicted the general "ideology" of his particular bureaucracy. 42
A large majority (80 percent) of the bureaucrats interviewed were able to cite
one or more examples of things they did which directly affected other countries or
foreign firms. This direct role, either by exercising individual discretion or by
helping to shape policy, was played almost as frequently by officials in main
42 One of the two exceptions explained his job in the international division as getting the rest
of his department "a little big pregnant" through international collaboration. On interdependence he felt it was "central to everything" and then lamented that in his department it
seemed as if "everyone is fighting it." But his was far from the dominant view. International
activities for the most part tended to be justified by most international division officials as
serving domestic goals; as one FEA executive stated: "We must prevent the international tail
from wagging the dog of domestic policy."
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"functioning" arms of a bureaucracy as by those in the international wings. In the
list below of some of these activities only the last four were carried out by
respondents in the international section of their agencies.
Officials in the international divisions devoted more time to international
activities, a hardly surprising finding, but the estimates by officials in "operating"
divisions of the time they spent on international matters was not insignificant.
While 92 percent (12 of the 13) officials in international divisions spent over
one-fifth of their time on international problems, so did half of the other executives; and 20 percent (4 of 20) of these solely domestic officials met once a week or
more with foreign government officials. 43 Generally those outside the international
wings had greater discretion over "policy," usually exercising direction over specific
activities rather than having diffuse responsibilities for managing foreign activities
as was typical of many in international posts.
Sensitivity of officials to the stakes of other governments in the activity for
which they were responsible was also investigated. In general, officials recognized
these, but were not drawn toward great sensitivity or recognition of mutuality of
interests. Only 7 (20 percent) of those interviewed felt that other governments
shared a problem with the US (as opposed to its being "their problem and our
problem"). And only a similarly small number (9) worried that foreign governmental (or international) interests might not be adequately taken into account.
With respect to the concept of interdependence, nearly all seemed to conceive of
this, defined variously, as growing. Twenty-nine of 35 reported that growing
interdependence was a trend. 44 When asked how they felt about the idea of
interdependence, eight found it "a bad thing" and 12 others had mixed feelings
about it. Thus less than half (15 of 35) thought it was a positive, beneficial
phenomenon. While domestic officials were not overwhelmingly pleased at the
seeming growth of interdependence, those who reported a change in their views on
US responsibility for the overseas effect of domestic policies generally felt "interdependence" was a positive phenomenon. Seventy percent proposed that the US
should adjust to it. This suggests that when changes in opinion have occurred,
possibly resulting from interdependence demands, these have been toward more
internationalist views.
The activities of this selected group of "domestic" bureaucrats demonstrates
the broad scope of the international functions they perform. Some were heavily
involved in transnational networks dealing regularly with food or energy officials in
foreign governments or international organizations. Others directed operations
which were largely US in character, but international in impact: for instance, the
economic and agricultural data compilation and research in USDA that is relied

This group includes those in charge of research, legal activity and planning.
An argument that interdependence is growing in reality, as well as perceptually, is found in
Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality," World Politics,
Vol. 26, No. 1 (October 1973): 1-27.
43

44
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upon globally. The attitudes of these officials reflected their predominantly domestic mandate. Nevertheless the changes in outlook they did report indicated a shift
towards acceptance of greater responsibility for global well-being as part of their
job.

III Conclusion
The international activity of the US domestic bureaucracy has been considerable. It seems to have fostered regular international contact and consciously
collaborative decision making on the part of US "domestic" government officials.
These organizational developments are perhaps transient, merely transitional devices
for international coordination and collaboration until more robust and dramatic
changes occur. Th.e establishment of certain more formal international organizations,
such as the International Wheat Council, however, seems to be largely a device for
facilitating and legitimizing an expansion of activities by US domestic bureaucracies. The lack of autonomy and real discretion exercised by such formal
organizations is widely recognized. Their importance is in supporting the role of
domestic bureaucracies, agencies with greater discretion. Thus many formal international organizations either promote informal communications, consultations,
and cooperation among officials in transgovernmental networks or act as "front"
organizations for more potent domestic bureaucracies, especially those in the
US, which may remain responsible for managing global activities.
I would expect to find parallels in multinational firms to these two international roles of government bureaucracies-those of resource management through
informal networks among domestic bureaucracies and of task performance as a kind
of surrogate for international organization. The officials of the major grain trading
and oil firms play an important role in the international flow of goods and services
in both these respects. Indeed their role is likely to be equally impressive. Such
firms anxiously keep track of current and likely government policy, and exchange
personnel with government bureaucracy as well. And, conversely, in recent years
efforts of the US government to keep track of corporate activity, especially in the
areas of food and energy, have risen sharply. The frequent consultations with
corporate officials indicated by some of those interviewed suggest that international networks for the management of global resources, such as food, energy, or
finance, include by necessity both public and private officials. While all such
officials are constrained by their separate organizational norms, they are also pulled
together by their shared stakes in outcomes that are acceptable (if not optimum) to
the core mandate of their respective organizations.
Several topics for further research are suggested by these findings. First, more
details on the institutionalization and uses of elite management networks is desirable. For instance, when international policy makers in the Department of Agriculture change, will successors be constrained by the exigencies of the policy
making post to form similar patterns of consultation and information exchange
with managers of large firms, producers' representatives, and foreign government
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officials? Second, other governments should be studied. The participation in transgovernmental networks of "domestic" bureaucrats in countries other than the
United States is of similar interest. Domestic politics is likely to be linked to global
policy-making in analogous fashion among all states, though these close links may
be more characteristic of states where a larger proportion of their transactions are
international than is characteristic of the largest states, e.g., China, the US and the
USSR. Finally, it would be interesting to compare bureaucrats with functional
responsibility, in energy or food for instance, with civil servants of intergovernmental organizations with a similar mandate. Do officials of the FAO (Rome) or
the IEA (Paris) have greater scope of discretion and weight of influence over global
food and energy outcomes than do officials in Agriculture or FEA in Washington?
Are their sources of information about global production and consumption
superior? Do they spend more time in international meetings? Do they have a
greater sensitivity to the internal problems of several states or a greater sense of
responsibility toward the solution of global problems? It is possible that these
international civil servants do not. In any event, it is clear that domestic bureaucrats
do have some responsibilities and attitudes we would expect to find among
bureaucrats in international organizations. Moreover, international bureaucrats are
likely to be concerned with the promotion of their own bureaucracy, even if that
requires acceptance of limits on their effective action to solve international problems set by what is acceptable to the foreign policy elites of diverse states. The
research suggested by these questions would help us determine whether international organization, in its broad functional sense, is growing within domestic
government bureaucracy, growing perhaps at a greater pace than it is at the level of
supra-national, intergovernmental institutions.
Another conclusion suggested by this research is that the attitudes of domestic government bureaucrats will be important in determing how international
problems are solved. Among states where national bureaucracies have had an
expanding role in regulating transnational relations, the sensitivities, predispositions, and mood of domestic bureaucrats will affect the degree of cooperation and
collaboration that occurs and the extent to which mutually satisfying outcomes are
reached. Even when predispositions are favorable, as between the US and Great
Britain, and when foreign policy elites are primarily involved, crises of management
can arise as Neustadt has demonstrated in his study of the Suez and Skybolt
crises. 45 Yet in transgovernmental "domestic" areas cooperation has had some
success. The cooperation of the US and Canada with respect to energy, especially
oil, was considerable given the strain caused by Canada's decision to reduce exports
at a time when US dependency on OPEC countries was increasing. 46
Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
One FEA official recounted the major efforts that he and other US officials had made to
"depoliticize" energy relations through consultations with Canadian officials and concerted
pressure within the US government during 1974 and early 1975. Interview, June 6, 1975.
Similarly, Nye stresses the move toward bureaucratic agency resolution in US-Canadian relations in his essay, "Transnational Relationships and Interstate Conflicts: An Empirical Analysis," International Organization 28 (Autumn, 1974): 961-98.
45

46
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If officials in US domestic bureaucracy acquire a greater sense of foreign
policy responsibility and develop routines calling for a search for "mutual solutions," this is likely to promote a general acceptance of interdependence and the
development of shared norms and more institutionalized patterns of mutual accountability across nations. We may recall that the predispositions of these officials
will "define the situation" for them; and their definition of the situation will
determine what avenues of problem solution they follow. Certainly attitudes alone,
especially if they are in opposition to underlying reality, will not govern the pace or
extent to which organizational capacity emerges to manage global problems arising
from interdependencies. Nevertheless, the knowledge, experience, and outlook of
domestic government officials now responsible for various parts of international
activities do establish the framework within which future evolution toward more
comprehensive or holistic approaches to global problem-solving will occur. 47
Robert Cox has proposed three broad approaches for speculation about
future world order. He is critical of the liberal-pluralist and positivist-evolutionary
approaches, and inclines toward seeing conflict and crises as leading to structural
changes.48 While such dramatic and dialectical changes are possible, the growing
role of US domestic government bureaucracy in managing aspects of international
order suggests that evolutionary, accretional, modifications are more than possible,
they are occurring. Future world order, then, may well be emerging from the
gradual shifts in the tasks, responsibilities, and loyalties of domestic government
bureaucrats. The US bureaucracies, including domestic departments and agencies
and by extension other national governments as well, through participation in
transgovernmental networks and through provision of collective benefits, lay the
foundation for a transformation of world order. Such a change, however, is likely
to be gradual, occurring over decades at best. Dramatic, rapid events, such as those
Cox foresees, can crystallize and publicize a new world order only after underlying
changes in domestic national societies are well advanced.

47 For the importance of attitudes in shaping organizational behavior see Alexander George,
"Toward a More Soundly Based Foreign Policy," Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Goverment for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Appendix D (Washington: GPO,
forthcoming, 1976). Ernst Haas, "Is There a Hole," discusses the prospects of provisional
wholes emerging in "technology-task-environments" when interdependence creates purposes
and knowledge upon which new international regimes can be built.
48 Robert W. Cox, "On Thinking About Future World Order," World Politics, 28 (January
1976): 175-96. It is difficult to be sure whether the differences Cox finds among his three
approaches are due to basic theoretical differences or to a focus on a different time frame in
which change events are likely to occur. In any event both his favored historical-dialectic
approach and the emphasis I have placed on the attitudes of bureaucratic managers emphasize
the role of ideas in change as human minds respond to "facts" that confront them with new
interpretations of reality and the obligations that follow.
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